Co-authored by John Gill (Kaseware) and Jane van Tienen (OSINT Combine)

Recent news stories relating to Jensen Huang, the former CEO of the leading US semiconductor and Artificial Intelligence technology company, NVIDIA, have raised awareness around the risks senior individuals within organizations may face from foreign intelligence.  

Media reporting has described an ongoing US counterintelligence investigation in the USA to determine whether a businesswoman Jensen Huang had a personal relationship with was acting on behalf of Chinese intelligence. However, at the time of writing, US authorities had not reached a conclusion on that allegation, and the publicly available information does not establish that Huang knowingly disclosed any sensitive information or was successfully influenced by a foreign intelligence service.  

Whatever the investigation ultimately determines, it raises a broader question worth examining. Why might foreign intelligence services be interested in senior corporate executives, and what does this mean for the organizations responsible for protecting them? 

In our previous article, ‘The Growing Role of Corporate Security In National Security’, we looked at some of the threats that can be posed to private sector businesses with national security interests. This article approaches the topic from a different angle, looking at the executives who lead those businesses: why they can be intelligence targets, how corporate and national interests overlap, and what this means for protective intelligence and executive protection, writ large.  

Why Executives Can Be Intelligence Targets

Foreign intelligence services have long sought access to people who hold valuable information or can influence important decisions. Corporate executives are no exception. What has changed is the strategic importance of the industries and technologies many of these individuals now lead. The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the US ODNI demonstrates the convergence of commercial technology, geopolitical competition and national security in today’s threat environment. 

An executive’s intelligence value extends well beyond access to confidential information or intellectual property. They may have insight into future investment decisions, technology development, government relationships, commercial negotiations or the direction of an entire industry. Their professional networks can also provide access to other individuals of interest. In some circumstances, understanding what an executive is thinking or planning may be just as valuable as obtaining a particular document. 

Importantly, intelligence targeting does not always begin with an obvious attempt to obtain sensitive information. Foreign intelligence services may seek to develop relationships over time, sometimes through apparently legitimate business opportunities, professional introductions, children’s sports activities, or shared interests to establish access and trust. Nor does an executive need to knowingly cooperate with an intelligence service to provide information of value. 

The FBI’s June 2026 guidance on foreign virtual targeting describes how foreign intelligence services use professional networking platforms, recruitment approaches and consulting opportunities to identify and cultivate individuals with valuable knowledge or access. What initially appears to be an ordinary professional interaction can, in some circumstances, become a means of intelligence collection. 

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) can also support this early targeting process. Corporate announcements, conference appearances and other publicly available information can reveal an executive’s responsibilities, relationships and strategic priorities. Individually, these details may seem unremarkable. Together, they can provide a detailed picture of someone’s professional influence, interests and potential access. 

Understanding how this information might be used by a foreign intelligence service is equally important for those responsible for protecting executives. For corporate security teams, the question is not simply whether an executive possesses sensitive information, but why they might be of interest to a foreign intelligence service and what that service could hope to gain through access to them. That question matters most when an executive leads a company working in an area of strategic importance. 

When Corporate Interests Become National Interests

The distinction between commercial interests and national security has become increasingly difficult to draw, particularly in industries such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, telecommunications, biotechnology and critical infrastructure. 

Much of the technology that underpins national security is developed, owned or operated by private companies. Decisions about research priorities, investment, international partnerships and access to technology can therefore have implications well beyond a company’s commercial performance. This makes the individuals influencing those decisions potentially attractive intelligence targets. 

China provides a useful illustration of this intersection between commercial and national interests. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2025-2030) places considerable emphasis on technological self-reliance, industrial capability and leadership in strategically important sectors, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing. These priorities are not simply commercial ambitions but are part of a broader national strategy in which economic development, technological advantage and national security are closely connected. 

This strategic context helps explain why businesses operating in these sectors, and the people working within them, may attract foreign intelligence interest. While international commercial and academic engagement is overwhelmingly legitimate, there are documented cases where such relationships have been exploited for intelligence purposes. 

One example is the case of Yanjun Xu, an officer of China’s Ministry of State Security who was convicted in the US for attempting to obtain aviation-related trade secrets from American companies, including GE Aviation. Xu used professional and academic engagements to gain access to individuals with valuable technical knowledge, including arranging travel to China under the guise of legitimate presentations and subsequently seeking sensitive technical information. His conviction and 20-year prison sentence were upheld on appeal in 2024. 

The US Department of Justice’s account of the case illustrates how legitimate professional environments can be exploited for intelligence purposes. It also highlights that foreign intelligence interest is not necessarily confined to senior executives. Technical specialists, researchers and others with access to strategically valuable information may be equally attractive targets. 

This is not a challenge unique to China. Foreign intelligence services pursue their respective national interests, and the risks facing a particular business will depend on its activities, technology, markets and relationships.  

Understanding those risks requires awareness of the broader strategic environment, including the priorities and activities of foreign states. Publicly available information, such as government policy documents, research publications and corporate disclosures, can provide valuable context. As explored in OSINT Combine’s blog Using OSINT to Analyze China’s Two Sessions, these sources can help organizations identify emerging strategic priorities and consider their potential implications. 

There is also a growing need for cooperation between government and industry. Government intelligence agencies may have insight into foreign intelligence intentions and activities that individual companies cannot readily obtain. Corporate security teams, meanwhile, may be better placed to recognize unusual approaches, concerning relationships or changes in activity within their own organizations. 

Neither necessarily has the complete picture. Appropriate information sharing can help connect those perspectives, enabling a more informed understanding of potential threats and supporting timely, proportionate responses. 

Protective Intelligence Needs to Evolve

Understanding that senior executives may be targets of foreign intelligence means that protection strategies must adapt.  Executive protection programs have typically focused on physical security, including the management of travel, public appearances, workplace security and threats of violence. While these responsibilities remain essential, they are only part of the rapidly evolving risk environment facing senior leaders in strategically significant organizations.  

Understanding why senior individuals may be targets of foreign intelligence interest should form part of the risk assessment for organizations. This enables consideration of not only immediate threats to personal safety, but also opportunities for intelligence collection, cultivation or influence, which may occur during legitimate professional activities.  

Having a strong and effective protective intelligence capability enables consideration of these factors within security planning.  This enables the identification of relevant vulnerabilities, assessment of potential consequences and the implementation of suitable protective measures. The objective is not to unnecessarily restrict an executive’s professional activities, but to enable them to operate confidently while managing risks that may extend beyond their personal safety. 

Identifying Emerging Threats

Being successful depends on identifying emerging threats early while ensuring that information is shared appropriately across all areas of security, including executive protection, investigations, cyber security and external intelligence. 

While unusual relationships, suspicious messages, or changes in behavior may appear unremarkable in isolation, the combination of this information may indicate an issue requiring investigation or mitigation.  

Using OSINT can help provide context and corroboration in conjunction with internal security reporting, cyber intelligence and other relevant information. However, it is important to conduct a thorough analysis of the information. To make informed decisions about security, information must be verified 

Taken altogether, effective protective intelligence requires clear intelligence requirements, appropriate information sharing, sound analytical processes as well as processes for coordinating a response. 

This doesn’t mean investigating an executive’s private life becomes a matter of routine. Protective intelligence should be grounded in clear, identifiable risks, using legal and proportionate information gathering, and appropriately balancing respect for individual privacy. 

Protecting Executives, Protecting National Interests

The recent attention surrounding Jensen Huang illustrates why corporate security can’t always be considered separately from the wider intelligence and national security environment. It also underscores the importance of recognizing legitimate intelligence risks without exceeding the available evidence.  Given that economic competition, technology leadership and national security are increasingly linked, corporate security teams must be aware of this wider context. Protecting an executive is no longer just about understanding who might wish to cause harm to them physically, but who may be looking to gain access, to influence or to exploit them, and why. 

Within strategically significant industries, having effective protective intelligence can help protect not only individuals within the organization, and organizational resilience, but in some cases, it can also help to protect our broader national interests. As the line between corporate and national security continues to blur, understanding why an executive may be targeted is an important first step in protecting them, their respective organizations and the wider national interest. 

More Resources on Protective Intelligence & Emerging Threats

Kaseware Resources

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OSINT Combine Resources

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